INC-2026-0123
MEDIUMOpenReported by Sarah Kim — Water Treatment Operator
Incident Description
Chlorine dosing pump malfunction led to over-dosing of treated water. Elevated chlorine levels detected at discharge point. Level exceeded licence limit for 2 hours before correction.
Immediate Actions Taken
- 1Dosing pump isolated
- 2Manual dosing initiated
- 3Environmental regulator notification prepared
- 4Downstream sampling commenced
Likelihood x Consequence Matrix
| Insignificant | Minor | Moderate | Major | Catastrophic | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Almost Certain | |||||
| Likely | |||||
| Possible | |||||
| Unlikely | |||||
| Rare |
Likelihood
3 / 5 — Possible
Consequence
3 / 5 — Moderate
Risk Score
9/25
Failed / Breached Controls
Procedural Compliance
Standard procedure not fully followed
Controls That Held
PPE Usage
All personnel wearing correct PPE
Supervision
Supervisor was present in the area
Priority Questions
- What were the direct and contributing causes of this incident?
- Were all relevant procedures followed by personnel involved?
- Was there adequate supervision at the time of the incident?
Follow-Up Questions
- Were there any similar incidents in the past that could have predicted this?
- Were all personnel adequately trained for the task being performed?
- Were environmental conditions a contributing factor?
Systemic Questions
- Does this incident indicate a gap in the current risk management framework?
- Are there systemic issues with procedure adherence in this area?
- Would additional engineering controls reduce the likelihood of recurrence?
Pre-start meeting completed
Incident occurred
Incident reported to supervisor
Area secured and barricaded
HSE team notified and on-scene
Initial investigation commenced
Report filed in SafetyScribe AI
Incident Details
06 February 2026 at 12:15 pm
Water Treatment Plant
Environmental Incident
Chemical Exposure
Night Shift
Sarah Kim — Water Treatment Operator
- Water Treatment Operator — Sarah Kim